

Set theories with classes

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Classes in naive set theory

The absence of a formal distinction between sets and classes in naive set theory led to supposed paradoxes.

Russell's Paradox

*Let X be the **set** of all sets that are not members of themselves. Assuming $X \in X$ implies $X \notin X$ and assuming $X \notin X$ implies $X \in X$.*

Burali-Forti's Paradox

*The **set** of all ordinals is itself an ordinal larger than all ordinals and therefore cannot be an ordinal.*

Classes in first-order set theory

The objects of first-order set theory are **sets**.

Definition: A **class** is a first-order definable (with parameters) collection of sets.

Classes play an important role in modern set theory.

- Inner models
- Ord-length products and iterations of forcing notions
- Elementary embeddings of the universe

But first-order set theory does not provide a framework for understanding the structure of classes.

In first-order set theory we **cannot** study:

- non-definable collections of sets,
- properties which quantify over classes.

Second-order set theory is a formal framework in which both sets and classes are objects of the set-theoretic universe. In this framework, we can study:

- non-definable classes
- general properties of classes

Why second-order set theory?

Kunen's Inconsistency

How do we formalize the statement of [Kunen's Inconsistency](#) that there is no non-trivial elementary embedding $j : V \rightarrow V$?

The following result is nearly [trivial](#) to prove.

Theorem: If $V \models \text{ZF}$, then there is no [definable](#) non-trivial elementary embedding $j : V \rightarrow V$.

A [non-trivial](#) formulation must involve the existence and formal properties of non-definable collections.

Kunen's Inconsistency: A model of [Kelley-Morse](#) second-order set theory cannot have a non-trivial elementary embedding $j : V \rightarrow V$.

Why second-order set theory?

Properties of class forcing

Question: Does every class forcing notion satisfy the **Forcing Theorem**?

Fails in weak systems, holds in stronger systems.

Question: Does every class forcing notion have a **Boolean completion**?

Depends on how you define Boolean completion, with the right definition holds in strong systems.

Question: If two class forcing notions **densely embed** must they be **forcing equivalent**?

No.

Question: Does the **Intermediate Model Theorem** (all intermediate models between a universe and its forcing extension are forcing extensions) hold for class forcing?

Fails in weak systems, holds partially in stronger systems.

Why second-order set theory?

Truth predicates

Informal definition: A **truth predicate** is a collection of Gödel codes

$$T = \{\ulcorner \varphi(\bar{a}) \urcorner \mid V \models \varphi(\bar{a})\},$$

where $\varphi(x)$ are first-order formulas.

Theorem: (Tarski) A truth predicate is **never** definable.

Models of sufficiently strong second-order set theories have **truth predicates**, as well as **iterated truth predicates**.

Second-order set theory

Second-order set theory has two sorts of objects: **sets** and **classes**.

Syntax: Two-sorted logic

- Separate variables for sets and classes
- Separate quantifiers for sets and classes
- Convention: upper-case letters for classes, lower-case letters for sets
- Notation:
 - ▶ Σ_n^0 - first-order Σ_n -formula
 - ▶ Σ_n^1 - n -alternations of class quantifiers followed by a first-order formula

Semantics: A model is a triple $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle$.

- V consists of the **sets**.
- \mathcal{C} consists of the **classes**.
- Every set is a class: $V \subseteq \mathcal{C}$.
- $C \subseteq V$ for every $C \in \mathcal{C}$.

Alternatively, we can formalize second-order set theory with classes as the only objects and define that a set is a class that is an element of some class.

Gödel-Bernays set theory GBC

Axioms

- **Sets:** ZFC
- **Classes:**
 - ▶ Extensionality
 - ▶ **Replacement:** If F is a function and a is a set, then $F \upharpoonright a$ is a set.
 - ▶ **Global well-order:** There is a class well-order of sets.
 - ▶ **Comprehension scheme for first-order formulas:**
If $\varphi(x, A)$ is a first-order formula, then $\{x \mid \varphi(x, A)\}$ is a class.

Models

- L together with its definable collections is a model of GBC.
- Suppose $V \models \text{ZFC}$ has a definable global well-order. Then V together with its definable collections is a model of GBC.
- **Theorem:** (folklore) Every model of ZFC has a forcing extension with the same sets and a global well-order. Force to add a Cohen sub-class to Ord.

Strength

- GBC is equiconsistent with ZFC.
- GBC has the same first-order consequences as ZFC.

GBC + Σ_1^1 -Comprehension

Axioms

- GBC
- **Comprehension for Σ_1^1 -formulas:**
If $\varphi(x, A) := \exists X \psi(x, X, A)$ with ψ first-order, then $\{x \mid \varphi(x, A)\}$ is a class.

Note: Σ_1^1 -Comprehension is **equivalent** to Π_1^1 -Comprehension.

Question: How **strong** is GBC + Σ_1^1 -Comprehension?

Meta-ordinals

Suppose $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \models \text{GBC}$.

Definition: A **meta-ordinal** is a well-order $(\Gamma, \leq) \in \mathcal{C}$.

- Examples: Ord , $\text{Ord} + \text{Ord}$, $\text{Ord} \cdot \omega$.
- Notation: For $a \in \Gamma$, $\Gamma \upharpoonright a$ is the restriction of the well-order to \leq -predecessors of a .

Theorem: $\text{GBC} + \Sigma_1^1\text{-Comprehension}$ proves that any two meta-ordinals are comparable.

- Suppose (Γ, \leq) and (Δ, \leq) are meta-ordinals.
- Let $A = \{a \in \Gamma \mid \Gamma \upharpoonright a \text{ is isomorphic to an initial segment of } (\Delta, \leq)\}$ (exists by $\Sigma_1^1\text{-Comprehension}$)
- If $A = \Gamma$, then (Γ, \leq) embeds into (Δ, \leq) .
- Otherwise, let a be \leq -least not in A . Then $\Gamma \upharpoonright a$ is isomorphic to (Δ, \leq) , where b is immediate \leq -predecessor of a .

Question: Does GBC imply that any two meta-ordinals are comparable?

Problem: Meta-ordinals don't need to have unique representations! Unless...



Elementary Transfinite Recursion ETR

Suppose $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \models \text{GBC}$.

Definition: Suppose $A \in \mathcal{C}$ is a class. A **sequence of classes** $\langle C_a \mid a \in A \rangle$ is a single class C such that $C_a = \{x \mid \langle a, x \rangle \in C\}$.

Definition: Suppose $\Gamma \in \mathcal{C}$ is a **meta-ordinal**. A **solution along Γ** to a **first-order recursion rule** $\varphi(x, b, F)$ is a **sequence of classes** S such that for every $b \in \Gamma$, $S_b = \varphi(x, b, S \upharpoonright b)$.

Elementary Transfinite Recursion ETR: For every meta-ordinal Γ , every first-order recursion rule $\varphi(x, b, F)$ has a solution along Γ .



Theorem: $\text{GBC} + \Sigma_1^1\text{-Comprehension}$ implies **ETR**. Let $A = \{a \mid \varphi(x, b, F) \text{ has a solution along } \Gamma \upharpoonright a\}$.

ETR $_{\Gamma}$: Elementary transfinite recursion for a **fixed Γ** .

- $\text{ETR}_{\text{Ord} \cdot \omega}$, ETR_{Ord} , ETR_{ω}

Theorem: (Williams) If $\Gamma \geq \omega^{\omega}$ is a (meta)-ordinal, then $\text{GBC} + \text{ETR}_{\Gamma \cdot \omega}$ implies $\text{Con}(\text{GBC} + \text{ETR}_{\Gamma})$.

Truth Predicates

Suppose $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \models \text{GBC}$.

Definition: A class $T \in \mathcal{C}$ is a **truth predicate** for $\langle V, \in \rangle$ if it satisfies **Tarski's truth conditions**: For every $\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner \in V$ (φ possibly nonstandard),

- if φ is atomic, $V \models \varphi(\bar{a})$ iff $\ulcorner \varphi(\bar{a}) \urcorner \in T$,
- $\ulcorner \neg \varphi(\bar{a}) \urcorner \in T$ iff $\ulcorner \varphi(\bar{a}) \urcorner \notin T$,
- $\ulcorner \varphi(\bar{a}) \wedge \psi(\bar{a}) \urcorner \in T$ iff $\ulcorner \varphi(\bar{a}) \urcorner \in T$ and $\ulcorner \psi(\bar{a}) \urcorner \in T$,
- $\ulcorner \exists x \varphi(x, \bar{a}) \urcorner \in T$ iff $\exists b \ulcorner \varphi(b, \bar{a}) \urcorner \in T$.

Observation: If T is a truth predicate, then $V \models \varphi(\bar{a})$ iff $\ulcorner \varphi(\bar{a}) \urcorner \in T$.

Corollary: **GBC cannot imply** that there is a truth predicate.

Observation: If T is a truth predicate and $\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner \in \text{ZFC}^V$ (φ possibly nonstandard), then $\varphi \in T$.

Theorem: If there is a truth predicate $T \in \mathcal{C}$, then V is the union of an elementary chain of its rank initial segments V_α :

$$V_{\alpha_0} \prec V_{\alpha_1} \prec \cdots \prec V_{\alpha_\xi} \prec \cdots \prec V,$$

such that V thinks that each $V_{\alpha_\xi} \models \text{ZFC}$.

Let $\langle V_\alpha, \in, T \cap V_\alpha \rangle \prec_{\Sigma_1} \langle V, \in, T \rangle$.

Iterated truth predicates

Theorem: $\text{GBC} + \text{ETR}_\omega$ implies that for every class A , there is a **truth predicate** for $\langle V, \in, A \rangle$. A truth predicate is defined by a **recursion** of length ω .

Theorem: (Fujimoto) GBC together with the assertion that for every class A , there is a truth predicate for $\langle V, \in, A \rangle$ implies ETR_ω .

Theorem: $\text{GBC} + \text{ETR}_\omega$ (and therefore $\text{GBC} + \Sigma_1^1\text{-Comprehension}$) implies $\text{Con}(\text{ZFC})$, $\text{Con}(\text{Con}(\text{ZFC}))$, etc.

Definition: Suppose $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \models \text{GBC}$ and (Γ, \leq) is a **meta-ordinal**. A sequence of classes $\vec{T} = \langle T_a \mid a \in \Gamma \rangle$ is an **iterated truth predicate of length Γ** if for every $a \in \Gamma$, T_a is a truth predicate for $\langle V, \in, \vec{T} \upharpoonright a \rangle$.

Theorem: (Fujimoto)

- Suppose $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \models \text{GBC}$ and $\Gamma \geq \omega^\omega$ is a meta-ordinal. ETR_Γ is **equivalent** to the existence of an **iterated truth predicate of length Γ** .
- Over GBC , ETR is equivalent to the existence of an **iterated truth predicate of length Γ** for every meta-ordinal Γ .

A **single recursion**, the **iterated truth recursion**, suffices to give **all** other recursions.

The second-order constructible universe

Suppose $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \models \text{GBC} + \text{ETR}$.

Theorem: $\text{GBC} + \text{ETR}$ implies that any two meta-ordinals are comparable.

Problem: Meta-ordinals don't need to have unique representations! Unless...

Given a meta-ordinal Γ , we can build a meta-constructible universe L_Γ by a recursion of length Γ .

Definition: A meta-ordinal Γ is **constructible** if there is another meta-ordinal Δ such that L_Δ has a well-order of Ord isomorphic to Γ . (“ $\Gamma \in L_{\text{Ord}^+}$ ”)

Theorem: (Tharp) Constructible meta-ordinals have unique representations.

Definition:

- A class $A \in \mathcal{C}$ is **constructible** if there is a constructible meta-ordinal Γ such that $A \in L_\Gamma$.
- The **second-order constructible universe** is $\mathcal{L} = \langle L, \in, \mathcal{L} \rangle$, where \mathcal{L} consists of the constructible classes.

Theorem: If $\mathcal{V} \models \text{GBC} + \Sigma_1^1\text{-Comprehension}$, then $\mathcal{L} \models \text{GBC} + \Sigma_1^1\text{-Comprehension}$. It also satisfies a version of the Axiom of Choice for classes. (Coming up!)

The Class Forcing Theorem

Suppose $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \models \text{GBC}$ and $\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{C}$ is a class partial order.

Definition:

- A **class \mathbb{P} -name** is a collection of pairs $\langle \sigma, p \rangle$ such that $p \in \mathbb{P}$ and $\sigma \in V^{\mathbb{P}}$.
- G is **\mathcal{V} -generic for \mathbb{P}** if G meets every dense class $D \in \mathcal{C}$ of \mathbb{P} .
- The forcing extension $\mathcal{V}[G] = \langle V[G], \in, \mathcal{C}[G] \rangle$.

Observation: $\mathcal{V}[G]$ may **not satisfy GBC**. Force with $\text{Coll}(\omega, \text{Ord})$.

The Class Forcing Theorem: There is a **solution** to the **recursion** defining the **forcing relation for atomic formulas**.

Observation: Suppose the **Class Forcing Theorem** holds.

- The **forcing relation for all first-order formulas** with a fixed class parameter is a **class**.
- For every **second-order formula** $\varphi(x, Y)$ the relation $p \Vdash \varphi(\tau, \Gamma)$ is (second-order) **definable**.

Theorem: (Krapf, Njegomir, Holy, Lücke, Schlicht) **GBC** does not imply the **Class Forcing Theorem**.

Theorem: (G., Hamkins, Holy, Schlicht, Williams) Over **GBC**, **ETR_{Ord}** is equivalent to the **Class Forcing Theorem**.

Class games and determinacy

Let Ord^ω be the topological space of ω -length sequences of ordinals with the product topology.

Fix a class $A \subseteq \text{Ord}^\omega$.

The Game \mathcal{G}_A

- Player I (Alice) and Player II (Bob) alternately play ordinals for ω -many steps.

I	α_0	α_1	α_2	\dots	α_n
II	β_0	β_1	β_2	\dots	β_n

- Alice wins if $\vec{\alpha} = \langle \alpha_0, \beta_0, \alpha_1, \beta_1, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta_n, \dots \rangle \in A$. Otherwise, Bob wins.
- The game is **determined** if one of the players has a **winning strategy**.

Note: A strategy for a player in the game \mathcal{G}_A is a **class**.

Open Class Determinacy: \mathcal{G}_A is determined for every **open** $A \subseteq \text{Ord}^\omega$.

Clopen Class Determinacy: \mathcal{G}_A is determined for every **clopen** $A \subseteq \text{Ord}^\omega$.

Theorem: (G., Hamkins) $\text{GBC} + \Sigma_1^1\text{-Comprehension}$ implies **Open Class Determinacy**.

Theorem: (G., Hamkins) Over GBC, **ETR** is **equivalent** to **Clopen Class Determinacy**.

Beyond ETR

Theorem: (Sato) Over GBC, **Open Class Determinacy** is stronger than **ETR**.

Question: Is **ETR preserved** by tame forcing? Tame forcings preserve GBC.

Theorem: (G., Hamkins) Suppose $\mathcal{V} \models \text{GBC} + \text{ETR}_r$, \mathbb{P} is a tame forcing notion and $G \subseteq \mathbb{P}$ is \mathcal{V} -generic. Then $\mathcal{V}[G] \models \text{GBC} + \text{ETR}_r$.


Theorem: (Hamkins) Tame **countably strategically-closed** forcing preserves ETR.

Question: Can forcing **add meta-ordinals**?

Theorem: (Hamkins, Woodin) Over GBC, **Open Class Determinacy**

- is preserved by tame forcing,
- implies that **tame forcing does not add meta-ordinals**.

The hierarchy so far



Kelley-Morse set theory KM

Axioms

- GBC
- **Full comprehension:**
If $\varphi(x, A)$ is a **second-order** formula, then $\{x \mid \varphi(x, A)\}$ is a class.

Models

Suppose $V \models \text{ZFC}$ and κ is an **inaccessible** cardinal. Then $\langle V_\kappa, \in, V_{\kappa+1} \rangle \models \text{KM}$.

Theorem: (Antos) The theory **KM** is preserved by tame forcing.

Theorem: Suppose $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \models \text{KM}$. Then its constructible universe $\mathcal{L} = \langle L, \in, \mathcal{L} \rangle \models \text{KM}$. It also satisfies a choice principle for classes. (Next slide!)

A choice principle for classes

Choice Scheme (CC): Given a **second-order** formula $\varphi(x, X, A)$, if for every set x , there is a class X witnessing $\varphi(x, X, A)$, then there is a sequence of classes collecting witnesses for every x :

$$\forall x \exists X \varphi(x, X, A) \rightarrow \exists Y \forall x \varphi(x, Y_x, A).$$

Σ_n^1 -Choice Scheme (Σ_n^1 -CC): Choice Scheme for Σ_n^1 -formulas.

Set Choice Scheme (Set-CC): Given a **second-order** formula $\varphi(x, X, A)$ and a **set** a :

$$\forall x \in a \exists X \varphi(x, X, A) \rightarrow \exists Y \forall x \in a \varphi(x, Y_x, A).$$

Proposition: Suppose $V \models \text{ZFC}$ and κ is an **inaccessible** cardinal. Then $\langle V_\kappa, \in, V_{\kappa+1} \rangle \models \text{KM} + \text{CC}$.

Theorem: (Marek, Mostowski, Ratajczyk) If $\mathcal{V} \models \text{GBC} + \Sigma_n^1\text{-Comprehension}$, then its constructible universe $\mathcal{L} \models \text{GBC} + \Sigma_n^1\text{-Comprehension} + \Sigma_n^1\text{-CC}$.

- If $\mathcal{V} \models \text{KM}$, then its constructible universe $\mathcal{L} \models \text{KM} + \text{CC}$.
- The theories **KM** and **KM+CC** are **equiconsistent**.

Theorem: (G., Hamkins) There is a model of **KM** in which the **Choice Scheme** fails for ω -many choices for a **first-order** formula.

Theorem: (Antos, Friedman, G.) The theory **KM+CC** is preserved by tame forcing.

Fodor's Lemma for classes

The Class Fodor Principle: Every regressive class function $f : S \rightarrow \text{Ord}$ from a stationary class S into Ord is constant on a stationary subclass $T \subseteq S$.

Theorem: $\text{GBC} + \Sigma_1^0\text{-CC}$ implies the Class Fodor Principle.

- Suppose each $A_n = f^{-1}(\{n\})$ is not stationary.
- By $\Sigma_1^0\text{-CC}$, there is a sequence of clubs $\langle C_n \mid n < \alpha \rangle$ such that A_α misses C_α .
- Let $C = \Delta_{\alpha \in \text{Ord}} C_\alpha$. Then $C \cap S = \emptyset$.

Theorem: (G., Hamkins, Karagila) Every model of KM has an extension to a model of KM with the same sets in which the Class Fodor Principle fails.

- Force to add a class Cohen function $f : \text{Ord} \rightarrow \omega$.
- Let $A_n = \{\alpha \mid f(\alpha) > n\}$.
- Let $\mathbb{Q} = \prod_{n < \omega} \mathbb{Q}_n$ be the product forcing with \mathbb{Q}_n shooting a club through A_n .
- Let $G \subseteq \mathbb{Q}$ be \mathcal{V} -generic and take only classes added by some finite stage n .

Question: How strong is the Class Fodor Principle? Does it imply $\text{Con}(\text{ZFC})$?

Theorem: (G., Hamkins, Karagila) The Class Fodor Principle is preserved by set forcing.

Question: Is the Class Fodor Principle preserved by tame forcing?

The Łoś Theorem for second-order ultrapowers

Suppose $\mathcal{V} = (V, \in, \mathcal{C}) \models \text{KM}$.

- Suppose U is an **ultrafilter** on a **cardinal** κ .
- Define that functions $f : \kappa \rightarrow V$ and $g : \kappa \rightarrow V$ are **equivalent** when $\{\xi < \kappa \mid f(\xi) = g(\xi)\} \in U$.
- Let M be the **collection** of the **equivalence classes** $[f]_U$.
- Define that $[f]_U \mathbf{E} [g]_U$ when $\{\xi < \kappa \mid f(\xi) \in g(\xi)\} \in U$.
- Define that **class sequences** F and G are **equivalent** when $\{\xi < \kappa \mid F_\xi = G_\xi\} \in U$.
- Let \mathcal{M} be the **collection** of the **equivalence classes** $[F]_U$.
- $[f]_U \mathbf{E} [F]_U$ when $\{\xi < \kappa \mid f(\xi) \in F(\xi)\} \in U$.
- $\langle M, \mathbf{E}, \mathcal{M} \rangle$ is the **ultrapower** of $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle$ by U .
- Define $j : \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \rightarrow \langle M, \mathbf{E}, \mathcal{M} \rangle$ by $j(a) = [c_a]_U$ and $j(A) = [C_A]_U$.

The Łoś Theorem

Problem: For the class existential quantifier, we need


$$\mathcal{V} \models \forall \xi < \kappa \exists X \varphi(X, f(\xi)) \rightarrow \exists Y \forall \xi < \kappa \varphi(Y_\xi, f(\xi)).$$

Theorem: (G., Hamkins) Over KM, the **Łoś Theorem** for second-order ultrapowers is **equivalent** to **Set-CC**.

Back to first-order with KM+CC

Suppose $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \models \text{KM+CC}$.

- View each **extensional well-founded** class relation $R \in \mathcal{C}$ as **coding a transitive set**.
- Define a **membership relation E** on the collection of all such relations R (modulo isomorphism).
 - ▶ $\text{Ord} + \text{Ord}$, $\text{Ord} \cdot \omega$.
 - ▶ $V \cup \{V\}$.
- Let $\langle M_{\mathcal{V}}, E \rangle$, **the companion model of \mathcal{V}** , be the resulting **first-order structure**.
 - ▶ $M_{\mathcal{V}}$ has the **largest cardinal $\kappa \cong \text{Ord}^{\mathcal{V}}$** .
 - ▶ $V_{\kappa}^{M_{\mathcal{V}}} \cong V$.
 - ▶ $\mathcal{P}(V_{\kappa})_{\mathcal{V}}^{M_{\mathcal{V}}} \cong \mathcal{C}$.
 - ▶ $\langle M_{\mathcal{V}}, E \rangle \models \text{ZFC}_I^{-}$. (Next slide!)



The theory $ZFC_{\aleph_1}^-$

Axioms

- ZFC without powerset (Collection scheme instead of Replacement scheme).
- There is a largest cardinal κ .
- κ is inaccessible. (κ is regular and for all $\alpha < \kappa$, 2^α exists and $2^\alpha < \kappa$.)

Models

Suppose that $V \models ZFC$ and κ is inaccessible. Then $H_{\kappa^+} \models ZFC_{\aleph_1}^-$.

Moving to second-order

Suppose $M \models ZFC_{\aleph_1}^-$ with a largest cardinal κ .

- $V = V_\kappa^M$
- $\mathcal{C} = \{X \in M \mid X \subseteq V_\kappa^M\}$
- $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \models KM+CC$
- $M_{\mathcal{V}} \cong M$ is the companion model of \mathcal{V} .

Theorem: (Marek, Mostowski) The theory $KM+CC$ is bi-interpretable with the theory $ZFC_{\aleph_1}^-$.

The Class Reflection Principle

Reflection Principle: Every formula is **reflected** by a **transitive set**:

For every **first-order** formula $\varphi(x)$, there is a **transitive set** M such that for all $a \in M$, $\varphi(a)$ holds if and only if $M \models \varphi(a)$.

Theorem: (Lévy) ZFC proves the **reflection principle**.

Every first-order formula is **reflected** by some V_α .

Class Reflection Principle: Every formula is **reflected** by a **sequence of classes**:

For every **second-order** formula $\varphi(X)$, there is a **sequence of classes** $S = \langle S_\xi \mid \xi \in \text{Ord} \rangle$ such that for all $\xi \in \text{Ord}$, $\varphi(S_\xi)$ if and only if $\langle V, \in, S \rangle \models \varphi(S_\xi)$.

Theorem: Suppose $\mathcal{V} \models \text{KM} + \text{CC}$ and $M_{\mathcal{V}} \models \text{ZFC}_I^-$ is its companion model.

Then \mathcal{V} satisfies the **Class Reflection Principle** if and only if $M_{\mathcal{V}}$ satisfies the **Reflection Principle**.

Another class choice principle

ω -Dependent Choice Scheme (ω -DC): Given a second-order formula $\varphi(X, Y, A)$, if for every class X , there is another class Y such that $\varphi(X, Y, A)$ holds, then we can make ω -many dependent choices according to φ :

$$\forall X \exists Y \varphi(X, Y, A) \rightarrow \exists Y \forall n \varphi(Y_n, Y_{n+1}, A).$$

Theorem: Over $\text{KM}+\text{CC}$, ω -DC is equivalent to the Class Reflection Principle.

Question: Does $\text{KM}+\text{CC}$ imply ω -DC?

Conjecture: (Friedman, G.) $\text{KM}+\text{CC}$ does not imply the ω -DC.

Suppose that α is an uncountable regular cardinal or $\alpha = \text{Ord}$.

α -Dependent Choice Scheme (α -DC): Given a second-order formula $\varphi(X, Y, A)$, if for every class X , there is another class Y such that $\varphi(X, Y, A)$ holds, then we can make α -many dependent choices according to φ .

Proposition: If $\mathcal{V} \models \text{KM}+\alpha\text{-DC}$, then its companion model $M_{\mathcal{V}}$ satisfies that every first-order formula reflects to a transitive set that is closed under $<\alpha$ -sequences.

Theorem: If $\mathcal{V} \models \text{KM}$, then its constructible universe $\mathcal{L} \models \text{KM}+\text{CC}+\text{Ord-DC}$.

- The theories KM and $\text{KM}+\text{CC}+\text{Ord-DC}$ are equiconsistent.

Proposition: Suppose $V \models \text{ZFC}$ and κ is an inaccessible cardinal. Then $\langle V_{\kappa}, \in, V_{\kappa+1} \rangle \models \text{KM}+\text{CC}+\text{Ord-DC}$.

The Class Intermediate Model Theorem

Intermediate Model Theorem: (Solovay)

- If $V \models \text{ZFC}$ and $W \models \text{ZFC}$ is an **intermediate model** between V and its set-forcing extension $V[G]$, then W is a **set-forcing extension** of V .
- If $V \models \text{ZF}$ and $V[a] \models \text{ZF}$, with $a \subseteq V$, is an **intermediate model** between V and its set-forcing extension $V[G]$, then $V[a]$ is a **set-forcing extension** of V .

Definition: Suppose $\mathcal{V} = \langle V, \in, \mathcal{C} \rangle \models \text{GBC}$. Then $\mathcal{W} = \langle W, \in, \mathcal{C}^* \rangle$ is a **simple extension** of \mathcal{V} if \mathcal{C}^* is **generated** by \mathcal{C} together with a single new class.

- **Forcing** extensions are **simple extensions**.

Definition: Suppose T is a **second-order set theory**.

- The **Intermediate Model Theorem holds for T** if whenever $\mathcal{V} \models T$ and $\mathcal{W} \models T$ is an **intermediate model** between \mathcal{V} and its class-forcing extension $\mathcal{V}[G]$, then \mathcal{W} is a **class-forcing extension** of \mathcal{V} .
- The **simple Intermediate Model Theorem holds for T** if whenever $\mathcal{V} \models T$ and $\mathcal{W} \models T$ is a **simple extension** of \mathcal{V} between \mathcal{V} and its class-forcing extension $\mathcal{V}[G]$, then \mathcal{W} is a **class-forcing extension** of \mathcal{V} .

The Class Intermediate Model Theorem (continued)

Theorem:

- (Friedman) The **simple Intermediate Model Theorem for GBC fails**.
- (Hamkins, Reitz) The **simple Intermediate Model Theorem for GBC fails** even for **Ord-cc forcing**.

Theorem: (Antos, Friedman, G.) The **simple Intermediate Model Theorem for KM+CC holds**.

Theorem: (Antos, Friedman, G.) Every model $\mathcal{V} \models \text{KM+CC}$ has a forcing extension $\mathcal{V}[G]$ with a **non-simple intermediate model**. Therefore the **Intermediate Model Theorem for KM+CC fails**.

Question: Does the **simple Intermediate Model Theorem for KM** hold?

Boolean completions of class partial orders

Definition: Suppose \mathbb{B} is a class Boolean algebra.

- \mathbb{B} is **set-complete** if all its subsets have suprema.
- \mathbb{B} is **class-complete** if all its subclasses have suprema.

Theorem: (Krapf, Njegomir, Holy, Lücke, Schlicht)

- Suppose $\mathcal{V} \models \text{GBC}$. A class partial order \mathbb{P} has a **set-complete Boolean completion** if and only if the **Class Forcing Theorem** holds for \mathbb{P} .
- If a **Boolean algebra** is **class-complete**, then it has the **Ord-cc**. Therefore a partial order has a **class-complete Boolean completion** if and only if it has the **Ord-cc**.

Definition: In a model of second-order set theory, a **hyperclass** is a **definable** collection of classes.

Definition: Suppose \mathbb{B} is a **hyperclass Boolean algebra**.

- \mathbb{B} is **class-complete** if all its subclasses have suprema.
- \mathbb{B} is **complete** if all its **sub-hyperclasses** have suprema.

Boolean completions of class partial orders (continued)

Theorem: Suppose $\mathcal{V} \models \text{GBC}$. Every class partial order \mathbb{P} has a class-complete hyperclass Boolean completion. Standard regular cuts construction.

Theorem: (Antos, Friedman, G.) Suppose $\mathcal{V} \models \text{KM}$. Then every class partial order \mathbb{P} has a complete hyperclass Boolean completion.

Theorem: (Antos, Friedman, G.) Suppose $\mathcal{V} \models \text{GBC}$. If some non-Ord-cc class partial order \mathbb{P} has a complete hyperclass Boolean completion, then $\mathcal{V} \models \text{KM}$.

Suppose $\mathcal{V} \models \text{KM} + \text{CC}$ and \mathbb{P} is class partial order. In the companion model $M_{\mathcal{V}}$ (with the largest cardinal κ):

- \mathbb{P} is a set partial order.
- \mathbb{P} has a class-complete Boolean completion \mathbb{B} .